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THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD MUST BE 
CONSIDERED BEFORE REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LEGITIMACY. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 
935 (1992). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The birth of a child is undoubtedly one of the most joyous and 
momentous events in a married couple's life. When an outsider to 
the marriage declares himself to be the father of that child, however, 
the family's unity and strength is put to the ultimate test. The 
husband and wife are forced to agonize over the painful marital 
issues of fidelity, trust, and betrayal. Even more distressing are their 
emotions surrounding the child's true paternity. Because the child is 
the focal point of the battle between the outsider and the married 
couple, it is often the child who stands to suffer the most lasting 
injuries. For this reason, the concerns of the adults must rank below 
those of the child. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland deserves high marks for its 
careful handling of this type of dispute in Turner v. Whisted. 1 The 
court reached a fair and equitable solution to an unfortunate set of 
circumstances. No doubt, Turner will be received as one of Mary-
land's most significant family law decisions in recent years. 
In Turner v. Whisted, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that where a man claims to be the natural father of a child who is 
statutorily presumed to be the legitimate child of another man,2 
paternity is more appropriately established in an equitable proceeding 
under the Estates & Trusts Article, 3 rather than in a statutory action 
pursuant to the Paternity Statute of the Maryland Family Law Article 
(Paternity Statute).4 Most importantly, the Turner court validated 
the use of blood tests for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy in 
order to establish paternity, so long as the trial court initially deter-
l. 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992). 
2. "A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate 
child of both spouses." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (1991 & 
Supp. 1994). "There is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legitimate 
child of the man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception." 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
3. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991). See infra text accompanying 
note 24 for content of § 1-208. 
4. Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (referring to MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW §§ 5-1001 to 5-1048 (1991 & Supp. 1994». 
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mines that a declaration of paternity will operate in the child's best 
interests. S 
The Turner case does not involve a typical paternity suit brought 
by the mother of a child against the biological father. The plaintiff 
in Turner was instead the putative father. Jeffrey Whisted (Jeffrey) 
was born approximately five and one-half months into the marriage 
of Kelly Whisted (Whisted) and Danny Whisted.6 At the time of 
Jeffrey's conception, Whisted and William Turner (Turner) were 
romantically involved. 7 
Two years later, Turner brought suit against Whisted in the 
Circuit Court for Harford County asserting that he was Jeffrey's 
biological father. 8 In his complaint, Turner sought, inter alia, visi-
tation rights over Jeffrey.9 After recognizing the presumption that 
Jeffrey was the legitimate child of Danny Whisted, Turner amended 
his complaint and named Danny Whisted as an additional defen-
dant. 1O Turner further sought a determination that he was Jeffrey's 
biological father. II To that end, Turner filed a inotion for blood 
testY 
The circuit court assumed that Turner's motion was filed pur-
suant to section 5-1029 of the Maryland Family Law Article. 13 The 
judge ruled that mandatory blood tests under section 5-1029 were 
not available to Turner for the purpose of rebutting Jeffrey's pre-
sumed legitimacy, and therefore denied the motion. 14 The court then 
granted the Whisteds' motion to dismiss on the grounds of laches. IS 
5. Id. at 116-17, 607 A.2d at 940. 
6. /d. at 109, 607 A.2d at 936. Jeffrey was born on March 8, 1986. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 109-10, 607 A.2d at 937. Jeffrey was two years old at the time. Originally, 
Turner attempted to proceed under the Paternity Statute. Id. at Ill, 607 A.2d 
at 937. However, he was denied the State's Attorney's consent. Id. As a result, 
Turner invoked the equitable powers of the circuit court to grant him visitation 
rights. Id. 
9. Id. at 109, 607 A.2d at 937. 
10. Id. at 110, 607 A.2d at 937. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. "On the motion of a party to the proceeding or on its own motion, the 
court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or 
genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being 
the father of the child." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029(a) (1991 & 
Supp. 1994). 
14. Turner, 327 Md. at 110, 607 A.2d at 937. 
15. Id. The Whisteds alleged that Turner delayed two years before seeking visita-
tion. Turner v. Whisted, No. 90-792, slip op. at 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 
22, 1991). The circuit court held that Turner's delay in seeking visitation over 
Jeffrey was too long. Id. 
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Turner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 16 
The intermediate court remanded the case back to the trial court, 
specifically on the issue of laches.17 Agreeing with the trial judge, 
the appellate court stated that initially the blood test provisions of 
the Paternity Statute are not available to overcome the presumption 
of legitimacy}S Thereafter, Turner appealed to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland 19 which granted certiorari. 20 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Maryland Paternity Statute provides a comprehensive frame-
work of legislation designed "to simplify the procedures for deter-
mining paternity, custody, guardianship, and responsibility for the 
support of children born out of wedlock."21 While clearly available 
to a mother alleging a man's paternity of her child, the Paternity 
Statute is rarely used by men seeking to establish paternity over 
presumptively legitimate childrenY 
16. Turner, 327 Md. at 110,607 A.2d at 937. 
17. [d. The court of special appeals held that the issue of whether Turner's delay 
in seeking visitation was too long was still in dispute. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. at 111,607 A.2d at 937. 
20. [d. 
21. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5·1002(b)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
22. In fact, apart from Turner, the court of appeals has heard only one other case 
where a putative father proceeded under the Paternity Statute. See Mattingly 
v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337, 609 A.2d 329 (1992) (decided one month after 
Turner). In that case, Shifflett, who impregnated a married woman with whom 
he was having an affair, instituted a suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County to establish paternity under the Paternity Statute. Section 5·1010 of 
the Family Law Article requires the State's Attorney's consent to proceed 
under the Paternity Statute, unless in "considering testimony or information 
given by affidavit," the court "finds that the complaint is meritorious" and 
"rules that the consent is not required." MD. CODE ANN., F AM. LAW § 5· 
1010 (1991 & Supp. 1994). As in Turner, the State's Attorney refused to 
consent to Shifflett's paternity action. Shifflett, 327 Md. at 340, 609 A.2d at 
329-30. Shifflett's motion to allow a paternity complaint without consent of 
the state's attorney was granted by the circuit court. [d. The judge ordered 
that the parties and the child submit to blood and DNA tests to determine 
paternity. [d. at 342, 609 A.2d at 331. Test results showed a 99.86070 probability 
that Shifflett was the father. [d. at 343, 609 A.2d at 331. Accordingly, the 
court granted Shifflett's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 
paternity and declared Shifflett to be the child's father. [d. at 343, 609 A.2d 
at 332. From this order, the child's mother and her husband appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. [d. The court of appeals issued a writ 
of certiorari before the intermediate court's decision. [d. The court of appeals 
did not review the issues raised in the circuit court, however, because the 
judge's order granting partial summary judgment was not a final judgment 
from which an appeal would lie. [d. at 343-44, 609 A.2d at 332. "Shifflett is 
not, therefore, of any precedential value." Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 
765 n.2, 621 A.2d 898, 901 n.2 (1993). 
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Apart from the Paternity Statute itself, and prior to Turner's 
affirmation of the statute, Maryland case law had hinted at another 
route possibly available to a man in Turner's position-a SUlt In 
equity under the Estates & Trusts Article. 23 Section 1-208 of the 
Estates & Trusts Article provides: 
(a) Child of his mother.- A child born to parents who have 
not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other 
shall be considered to be the child of his mother. 
(b) Child of his father.- A child born to parents who have 
not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other 
shall be considered to be the child of his father only if the 
father 
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an 
action brought under the statutes relating to paternity pro-
ceedings; or 
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; 
or 
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be 
his child; or 
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowl-
edged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father. 24 
Under this section, it seemed possible that a putative father claiming 
paternity over a presumptively legitimate child could offer evidence 
to show that the child was "born to parents who have not participated 
in a marriage ceremony with each other," and that one or more of 
the four conditions of section 1-208(b) were satisfied. 25 The possibility 
of applying section 1-208 for such purposes existed because the section 
had been accepted as a legitimating statute.26 Historically, however, 
section 1-208 was recognized as a means for establishing a parent-
child relationship for purposes 0 f inheritance only. 27 
Dawson v. Eversberg28 provides a good example of the traditional 
use of section 1-208. In Dawson, Frederick Eversberg moved in with 
Doris Dawson. 29 Over the next eleven years, the unmarried couple 
had six children together. 30 The couple separated and Dawson brought 
23. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991). 
24. Id. 
25. See id. 
26. See Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. I, 6-7, 497 A.2d 142, 144-45 (1985) (referring 
to § 1-208(b) of the Estates & Trusts Article as a more simple and less traumatic 
method of legitimizing a child, as contrasted with adoption). 
27. See Turner, 327 Md. at 119, 607 A.2d at 941 (Eldridge, J. dissenting in part). 
28. 257 Md. 308, 262 A.2d 729 (1970). 
29. Id. at 309, 262 A.2d at 730. 
30. Id. 
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suit under the Paternity Statute to legally establish Eversberg as the 
father of her six children. 31 The judge declared Eversberg to be the 
father and ordered him to pay support.32 Nearly three years later, in 
order to ensure that his children would be his legitimate heirs, 
Eversberg filed an adoption proceeding. 33 The court stated that where 
the objective is simply to legitimize a child for purposes of inheri-
tance, section 1-208 of Maryland's Estates & Trusts Article should 
be used as opposed to the more drastic adoption statutes.34 
Thomas v. Solis35 was the first major case to apply section 1-
208 in an effort to establish paternity for purposes outside of 
inheritance.36 The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that under 
section 1-208, Thomas could obtain his desired relieP7 even though 
he was not using the provision for inheritance purposes.38 Thomas 
espoused a broad application of the Estates & Trusts Article. The 
court stated that: 
[A] legitimation provision contained in an inheritance statute 
is not limited in its scope and application to matters of 
inheritance only. There certainly should be little that is 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732. For a discussion of the adoption statutes, see 
Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960) ("Unlike 
awards of custody ... adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural 
parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. "). 
35. 263 Md. 536, 283 A.2d 777 (1971). Nelson Thomas and Shirley Williams, an 
unmarried couple, parented four children, one of which died prior to the 
controversy. [d. at 538, 283 A.2d at 778. Williams subsequently left Thomas 
and was able to get custody over the children. [d. She later married Daniel 
Solis. [d. 
Shirley Williams Solis threatened that she and her husband would remove 
the children from the jurisdiction. [d. She also refused Thomas his visitation 
rights and informed him that she and her husband intended to adopt the 
children. [d. In response, Thomas filed a petition for declaratory relief in the 
Circuit Court for Prince George's County. [d. at 537, 283 A.2d at 778. Thomas 
requested the that court declare him the natural father, protect his visitation 
rights and those of his children, enjoin Shirley Williams Solis and Daniel Solis 
from adopting the children without first giving notice to him, and prevent the 
removal of the children from the jurisdiction. [d. In sustaining the demurrer 
to Thomas's petition, the circuit court ruled that there was nothing in the 
allegations, nor other circumstances, creating a justiciable issue. [d. at 539, 
283 A.2d at 779. Thus, the circuit court ruled that Thomas was not entitled 
to the relief sought. [d. 
36. In contrast to Thomas, Turner involved the use of § 1-208 to establish paternity 
for the purpose of gaining visitation rights-not for inheritance purposes. 
Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 109, 607 A.2d 935, 937 (1992). 
37. Solis, 263 Md. at 539, 283 A.2d at 779. 
38. [d. at 542-44, 283 A.2d at 780-81. 
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startling about such a concept, for the reason that no right 
or privilege in the history of the common law, or in statutor.y 
law, is accorded greater sanctity than the right of inheri-
tance. If the law provides a means of legitimation for the 
purposes of inheritance, such a procedure should certainly 
be of sufficient legal validity to establish other rights, oft-
times inferior to that of inheritance, arising from the rela-
tionship between parent and legitimate issue. 
The trend of the courts throughout the country is to 
give a liberal interpretation to legitimation statues or legis-
lation .... 39 
This strong language supports the notion that section 1-208 could be 
utilized by a man seeking to establish paternity over a presumptively 
legitimate child.40 
Whether seeking to establish paternity under the Paternity Statute 
or under the Estates and Trust Article, a putative father of a child 
born into a marriage must still challenge the presumption that the 
child is the legitimate child of the mother and her spouse.41 This is 
one of the strongest presumptions available in the law. 42 In Maryland, 
the presumption of legitimacy developed primarily under two sets of 
factual circumstances. The first set of circumstances is represented 
by cases involving men who were denied paternity. These cases 
generally included bastardy proceedings,43 nonsupport defenses,44 di-
vorce proceedings,45 or typical paternity suits where married mothers 
attempted to "bastardize" their children in order to prove that their 
paramours were their children's biological fathers.46 In the second 
39. /d. at 542, 283 A.2d at 780. 
40. See Turner, 327 Md. at 1I2, 607 A.2d at 938. 
41. See supra note 2. 
42. See William Weston, Putative Fathers' Rights to CustodY-A Rocky Road at 
Best, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 693 (1989). Without such a strong presumption, 
every newborn could be subject to legitimacy tests. [d. See also Traci Dallas, 
Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988); Tiana M. Hinnant, Note, Family Law-Lovers' 
Triangle Turns Bermuda Triangle: The Natural Father's Right To Rebut the 
Marital Presumption-Michael H. v. Gerald D., 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617 
(1990). 
43. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955); Hall v. State, 
176 Md. 488, 5 A.2d 916 (1939); Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319,2 A.2d 17 (1938). 
44. See, e.g., Dayhoff v. State, 206 Md. 25, 109 A.2d 760 (1954). 
45. See, e.g., HarwarJ v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 A. 318 (1938) (husband, as 
grounds for divorce, alleged that his wife's child was not his, but rather was 
the product of an adulterous affair). 
46. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 166 Md. 531, 171 A. 869 (1934). This type of 
paternity proceeding is referred to in this Casenote as the "typical" paternity 
action. In Maryland, the "typical" paternity action has been far more common 
than the Turner-type paternity suit. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Turner. 
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set of circumstances, children attempted to "bastardize" themselves 
by using their mothers' and/or presumed fathers' testimony to prove 
that other men were their biological fathers in order to inherit from 
them.47 
The presumption of legitimacy itself can be traced back to 1777 
where, in an ejectment case involving the issue of the claimant's 
paternity, Lord Mansfield of the Court of the King's Bench declared: 
[T]he law of England is clear that the declarations of a 
father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue 
born after marriage .... As to the time of birth, the father 
and mother are the most proper witnesses to prove it. But 
it is a rule founded in decency, morality, and policy, that 
they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they 
have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is 
spurious .... 48 
From Lord Mansfield's declaration, Maryland courts judicially cre-
ated the presumption "that the child of a married woman was the 
legitimate issue of her husband. "49 This presumption was rebuttable 
only "by clear and convincing testimony of a person other than the 
husband or mother, that the husband did not have intercourse with 
the mother at the time when conception of the child in question 
would have been possible. "50 Therefore, in the typical paternity suit, 
only after such testimony was offered could the mother and/or her 
husband, the presumed father, testify to any other relevant facts, 
such as her sexual relations with a paramour. 51 
The Lord Mansfield rule was the subject of a 1961 Governor's 
commission studying the problems of illegitimacy.52 The commission 
recommended a provision in the proposed Paternity Statute abrogat-
ing Lord Mansfield's rule. 53 Two years later, the Maryland General 
Assembly enacted the Paternity Statute at issue.54 Ultimately, section 
66F(b) of the statute only modified and relaxed Lord Mansfield's 
ruleY 
47. See, e.g., Hawbecker v. Hawbecker, 43 Md. 516 (1876). 
48. Staley v. Staley, 25 Md. App. 99, 102, 335 A.2d 114, 117 (1975) (quoting 
Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 592-94, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777». 
49. Id. at 102-03, 335 A.2d at 117. 
50. Id. 
5!. See id. 
52. Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 622, 241 A.2d 682, 684 (1968). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. "By Chapter 722 of the Laws of Maryland of 1963, the General Assembly 
enacted Code, Art. 16, §§ 66 and 66A to 66P." Id. (the Code was repealed 
by Acts 1984, Ch. 296, § I, effective October I, 1984). 
55. Staley, 25 Md. at 103, 335 A.2d at 117-18. 
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The new rule specified only one method for rebutting the pre-
sumption.56 In substance, the presumption could be rebutted by 
testimony of persons other than the mother and her husband that at 
the time of conception the married couple was living separate and 
apart from each other. 57 Therefore, in the typical paternity dispute, 
the court was required to determine whether the mother and her 
husband lived apart at the relevant time before both parties were 
allowed to "testify as to non-access as well as to any other relevant 
matters" tending to prove or disprove paternity. 58 Additionally, the 
new Paternity Statute replaced the clear and convincing standard, 
previously required to rebut the presumption, with the lower standard 
of preponderance of the evidence.59 
It is important to note that the new rule, at least initially, did 
not appear to be applicable to any actions other than those occurring 
. under the Paternity Statute.60 Thus, in Maryland, prior to 1968, two 
versions of Lord Mansfield's rule seemed to exist: The newly enacted 
Paternity Statute version applicable in paternity actions, and the case 
law version applicable in equitable actions where paternity was an 
issue connected to questions involving the right to inherit.61 
Then, in Shelley v. Smith,62 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
had the opportunity to decide which version of Lord Mansfield's 
rule would apply in equity proceedings to determine paternity for 
inheritance purposes.63 The court reasoned that "two different rules 
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66F(b) (1966) (repealed by Acts 1984, Ch. 296, 
§ I, effective October I, 1984). 
57. Staley, 25 Md. at 103, 335 A.2d at 118. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
60. Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 627, 241 A.2d 682, 686 (1968). 
61. [d. 
62. 249 Md. 619, 241 A.2d 682 (1968). 
63. [d. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686. In Shelley, Larry Smith claimed that the decedent, 
Mr. Shelley, was his true father so as to obtain a share of Shelley's estate. [d. 
at 625, 241 A.2d at 685. Of course, Shelley's acknowledged daughters alleged 
in defense that Larry Smith was not their father's son. [d. Larry's mother was 
married to Herbert Smith. [d. Herbert divorced Larry's mother claiming 
adultery with Mr. Shelley. [d. At the trial, a witness testified that Herbert 
Smith and Larry's mother were living apart for approximately two years. [d. 
The period of Larry's conception was within those two years. [d. Subsequently, 
Mr. Smith testified that he had nonaccess to Larry's mother during the time 
of Larry's conception. [d. The issue upon appeal was whether the chancellor 
erred in admitting Mr. Smith's testimony. [d. at 625, 241 A.2d at 686. 
Under Maryland's common-law rule, Smith's testimony was improperly 
admitted because the witness only testified to Smith and Larry's mother living 
apart, not to the sexual status of the couple. [d. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686. But, 
under the Paternity Statute rule, such testimony alone was sufficient. [d. The 
court of appeals held that the Paternity Statute rule applied, despite the fact 
that this suit was an equity proceeding that was not filed under the Paternity 
Statute. [d. at 630-31, 241 A.2d at 688. 
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[should not govern] the resolution of identical issues of paternity[:] 
the Lord Mansfield's presumption in cases like the one before us, 
and the section 66F(b) rule in paternity proceedings under the stat-
ute."64 The court stated that there was no reason why the Paternity 
Statute's presumption should not similarly apply in the rare cases 
where paternity is an issue in connection with inheritance rights. 65 
Shelley is valuable not only for its comprehensive analysis of 
Lord Mansfield's rule, but also because it establishes a bridge between 
the Paternity Statute and the Estates & Trusts proceedings. The 
willingness of the court to promote this interplay between the two 
statutes was crucial to Turner's ultimate holding that blood tests may 
be used to establish paternity.66 
Today, the Paternity Statute's presumption remains substantively 
unchanged under section 5-1028.67 In section 1-206 of the Estates & 
Trusts Article, the presumption was restated as follows: "A child 
born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate 
child of both spouses. "68 Unlike the Paternity Statute, though, section 
1-206 does not address how the presumption may be rebutted. 69 Based 
on the court's analysis in Shelley, it is highly probable that the 
section 1-206 presumption is rebuttable in the same way as prescribed 
under the Paternity Statute.70 
64. Id. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686-88. 
65. See ide at 630-31, 241 A.2d at 688. 
66. Turner V. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 113, 607 A.2d 935, 938 (1992). 
67. Section 5-1028 of the Family Law Article provides in pertinent part: 
(c) Presumption. - (I) There is a rebuttable presumption that the 
child is the legitimate child of the man to whom its mother was 
married at the time of conception. 
(2) The presumption set forth in this subsection may be rebutted by 
the testimony of a person other than the mother or her husband. 
(3) If the court determines that the presumption set forth in this 
subsection has been rebutted by testimony of a person ,other than the 
mother or her husband, it is not necessary to establish nonaccess of 
the husband to rebut the presumption set forth in this subsection. 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028 (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
68. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994). See supra 
note 2 for the text of § 1-206(a). 
69. Clearly, the § 1-206 presumption is rebuttable. "Unless otherwise expressly 
provided, whenever the estates of decedents law states that a fact is presumed, 
the presumption is rebuttable." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § I-105(b) 
(1991 & Supp. 1994). 
70. Cf Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 630-31, 241 A.2d 682, 688 (1968). "The 
[legitimacy] presumption . . . may be rebutted by the testimony of a person 
other than the mother or her husband." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
1028(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994). It should be noted that the fact that the 
presumption is rebuttable is purely a legislative policy decision, as it would not 
be a violation of the United States Constitution for the General Assembly to 
make the presumption irrebuttable. Michael H. V. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
( 1989). 
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One of the most effective ways for a putative father to rebut 
the presumption of legitimacy is to have a blood test conducted on 
the mother, the child, the presumed father, and himself. 71 Today, a 
man in Turner's position could file a Motion for Blood Test under 
section 5-1029 of the Paternity Statute72 in order to attempt to rebut 
the legitimacy presumption. Prior to Turner, however, there were 
conflicting judicial opinions as to whether such a motion would 
succeed at trial. 73 
While Maryland case law was silent on whether a man claiming 
to be the biological father of a child born to a married couple could 
use a blood test to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, case law in 
other jurisdictions was clear. There are three approaches that deal 
with the issue of whether blood test evidence should be allowed to 
rebut the presumption of legitimacy. 
One approach followed in a minority of jurisdictions is to 
absolutely deny a man in Turner's position from offering not only 
blood test evidence to rebut the presumption, but any evidence of 
his paternity of a presumptively legitimate child. 74 In these jurisdic-
tions the presumption is completely irrebuttable. The controversial 
plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.7S held that this approach is constitutional. 76 
At issue in Michael H. was California's statutory presumption that 
a child born to a married woman living with her husband is the 
child of that marriage. 77 The statute provides that only the husband 
71. See Hinnant, supra note 42, at 624 n.72; Joanne G. Hujsa, Comment, Scott 
v. Mershon: Disputing the Presumption oj Legitimacy, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
625, 636 n.87 (1991). 
72. See Mattingly v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337, 340, 609 A.2d 329, 330 (1992). See 
also supra note 22. 
73. While the Maryland statutes clearly allowed the presumption of legitimacy to 
be rebutted, see MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105 (1991 & Supp. 1994); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028 (1991 & Supp. 1994), uncertainty existed 
regarding how a putative father should proceed in his attempt to establish 
paternity over a presumptively legitimate child. 
74. See Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1981) (refusing 
to recognize that a natural father has standing to assert paternity because of 
the threat to family stability and the importance of the "time-honored pre-
sumption of legitimacy"). Other states under the Uniform Parentage Act have 
also decided that a man in Turner's position has no standing to rebut the 
presumption of legitimacy. See Hinnant, supra note 42, at 632. A majority of 
jurisdictions allow the putative father to rebut the presumption. See also Dallas, 
supra note 42, at 369. 
75. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
76. Id. at 130-32. 
77. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § -621 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed by 1992 
Cal. Stat. § 8 (A.B. 2650), operative Jan. 1, 1994, and relocated without 
substantive change to CAL. FAM. LAW CODE § 7500 (West 1993». 
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or wife, under limited circumstances, are entitled to rebut the pre-
sumption. 78 The first issue before the Court was whether California's 
presumption of legitimacy violated the due process rights of a man 
wishing to establish his paternity over a child born to the wife of 
another man. 79 The second issue was whether this presumption in-
fringed upon the child's constitutional right to maintain a relationship 
with her natural father. 80 In a five to four vote,81 the Court held 
that California's irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy does not 
violate the constitutional rights of either the putative father or the 
child.82 
A second approach in dealing with blood test evidence is to give 
the putative father an automatic right to rebut the presumption, 
78. [d. at 115. The California statute allows putative fathers to rebut the pre-
sumption, but only if at the time of conception, the husband and wife were 
not cohabitating, and the husband was impotent or sterile. CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 621 (West Supp. 1989). However, the putative father cannot ask for blood 
tests without the support of the wife. [d. Thus, under most circumstances, the 
California presumption may not be rebutted by putative fathers at all. Dallas, 
supra note 42, at 382 n.87. In effect, therefore, the California presumption 
was irrebuttable in Michael H. 
79. See infra note 82. 
80. See infra note 82. 
81. Justice Scalia was joined in his plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in all 
but note 6 of the plurality. [d. Justice O'Connor was joined in her concurring 
opinion by Justice Kennedy. [d. at 132. Justice Stevens filed a concurring 
opinion. [d. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun. [d. at 136. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
Brennan joined. [d. at 157. 
82. [d. at 129-32. The putative father first claimed that the presumption violated 
his procedural due process rights because it terminated his liberty interest in 
his relationship with his child without affording him an opportunity to establish 
paternity. [d. at 119. Justice S~alia, in his plurality opinion, rejected this 
argument. [d. at 119-21. Justice Scalia held that the presumption was in fact 
a substantive rule of law, which, in effect, stated California's substantive policy 
that an adulterous natural father shall not be recognized as a legal father. [d. 
at 120. Next, based on the theory that his relationship with the child was a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, the putative father claimed that his 
substantive due process rights were violated by the California law because the 
protection of the marital union is an insufficient state interest to support the 
termination of his liberty interest. [d. at 121. Justice Scalia rejected this claim 
as well, because the putative father failed to establish that his claimed liberty 
interest is one that is traditionally protected by our society so as to be considered 
"fundamental." [d. at 122-30. Justice Scalia also rejected the child's claim 
that the presumption infringed upon her claimed constitutionally protected right 
to maintain a relationship with the putative father, because ~ 'at best, her claim 
is the obverse of [the putative father's) and fails for the same reasons." [d. 
at 131. 
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including using blood test evidence.83 For example, a putative father 
in Colorado has a constitutional right to rebut the presumption of 
legitimacy by blood tests84 under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
federal and state constitutions, as well as the Equal Rights Amend-
ment of the state constitution.8s 
Under a third approach, the putative father is allowed to rebut 
the presumption and introduce evidence of blood tests only after he 
passes a threshold test. 86 In some jurisdictions, therefore, courts will 
grant a request for blood tests and allow the results into evidence 
once it has been established that a paternity determination will operate 
in the child's best interest. For example, in McDaniels v. Carlson,87 
the Washington Supreme Court held that where someone outside the 
family files a paternity action, the trial court must consider the best 
interests of the child in making any determinations. 88 The court 
argued that it may not always be in the best interests of the child to 
automatically establish the identity of the child's biological parents.89 
The McDaniels court stressed that the policy of maintaining the 
child's interest is always paramount. Among the factors important 
in the trial court's initial best interest determination are: (1) continuity 
of established relationships; (2) stability of the present home envi-
ronment; (3) existence of an ongoing family unit; (4) extent to which 
uncertainty of parentage exists in the child's mind; and (5) any other 
83. See Dallas, supra note 42, at 373-74. The policy behind this approach is 
"necessary to avoid the gender discrimination of favoring the mother over the 
natural father," Hinnant, supra note 42, at 633, and to "protect the putative 
father's alleged constitutional right to a relationship with his child," Dallas, 
supra note 42, at 374. 
84. The blood tests must show at least a 97!1Jo probability of the putative father's 
paternity. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-25-126(1)(e)(iv)-(v) (1989), 19-6-105(1)(f) 
(1990). 
85. R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 672 (Colo. 1980); see Hinnant, supra note 
42, at 634. 
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1989); McDaniels v. 
Carlson, 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987). 
87. 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987). 
88. Id. at 262. 
89. Id. at 261-62. The court stated: 
Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability 
and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent 
figure is not the natural parent. Our courts and legislature have echoed 
these concerns. A paternity suit by its very nature, threatens the 
stability of the child's world .... It may be true that a child's interests 
are generally served by accurate, as opposed to inaccurate or stipu-
lated, paternity determinations. However, it is possible that in some 
circumstances a child's interests will be even better served by no 
paternity determination at all. 
Id. at 262 (citations omitted). 
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relevant factors. 9O The court stated that the various factors must be 
considered on a case by case basis.91 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kansas held, in In re Marriage 
of Ross,92 that it is better to apply the best interest test before a 
court orders a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent 
is in fact the biological parent.93 The Kansas Supreme Court, in line 
with the Washington court's underlying policy, rejected the trial 
court's notion that the child's best interests are always served when 
the child's true paternity is established. 94 The Kansas high court 
stated that the trial court "has not only bastardized the child and 
relieved the presumed father of all necessity of support, but it has 
placed the obligation to support the child on the biological father, 
who has never had a bonding relationship with the child."95 
In holding that a best interest test must be applied before a 
blood test will be mandated, the Kansas court stated that 
[a] child's psychological tie to a parent is not a simple, 
uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his par-
ents not only bodily comfort and gratification, but also 
demands affection, companionship, and stimulating inti-
macy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly 
by the parent, the child-parent relationship becomes firm, 
with immensely productive effects on the child's intellectual 
and social development. Where there are changes qf the 
parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's 
vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become 
evident. 
So long as a child is part of a viable family, the child's 
own interests are merged with those of the other family 
members. 96 
While the facts and issues involved in Turner were comprehen~ 
sively dealt with in other jurisdictions, Maryland appellate courts 
had not yet addressed the issue. 
90. [d. at 262. 
91. [d. 
92. 783 P .2d 331 (Kan. 1989). 
93. [d. at 338. 
94. [d. at 338-39. The Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned that it is best to administer 
the blood test first, because if the presumed father is the biological father the 
case ends, but, if the blood tests determine the presumed father is not the 
biological father only then is a best interest hearing required. [d. at 338. The 
Kansas Supreme Court harshly criticized this logic. While recognizing the 
judicially economic advantages, the court stated that it is contrary to longstand-
ing public policy to bastardize a child born during a marriage. [d. 
95. [d. at 338. 
96. [d. (citations omitted). 
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III. THE INSTANT CASE 
As support for the argument that he was entitled to have a 
blood test ordered to prove paternity, Turner cited section 1-208 of 
the Maryland Estates & Trusts Article97 and Thomas v. SOIiS.98 In 
acknowledging the validity of establishing paternity under section 1-
208, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied on Thomas. Thomas 
stands for the proposition that "an unwed father, wishing to protect 
his visitation rights and assure entitlement to notice of any attempted 
adoption of the child," may seek a declaratory judgment that he is 
the child's natural father by satisfying any of the four methods 
outlined in section 1-208.99 The court stated that, on several occasions 
with regard to section 1-208, it had 
indicated that a "liberal interpretation" of our legitimation 
statute [section 1-208] was essential; that it was "not limited 
in its scope and application to matters of inheritance only" 
but was legally sufficient "to establish other rights, ... 
arising from the relationship existing between parent and 
legitimate issue," . . . and that the status sought by the 
father was afforded to him by compliance with the legiti-
mation statute. 1OO 
Consequently, we believe that Turner, alleging that Jeffrey 
was a child "born to parents who have not participated in 
a marriage ceremony with each other," 101 quite properly 
97. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991). 
98. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 111,601 A.2d 935,937 (1992). In his brief 
to the court of appeals, Turner argued that § 1-208 is not limited to matters 
of inheritance alone under Thomas v. Solis. Appellant's Brief at 4, Turner v. 
Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992) (No. 92-52). Furthermore, Turner 
argued that § 1-208 applied because he alleged that Jeffrey was born to parents 
who were not married. [d. at 5. Turner argued that the trial court's refusal to 
order a blood test improperly denied him the opportunity to establish paternity 
under § 1-208(b)(I). [d. at 4. 
99. Turner, 327 Md. at 111-12, 607 A.2d at 938 (citing Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 
536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971». Section 1-208 provides that a child born 
to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other 
will be considered the child of his father if the father: (1) was judicially 
determined to be the father in an action brought under the Paternity Statute; 
(2) acknowledged himself in writing to be the father; (3) openly and notoriously 
recognized the child to be his child; or (4) subsequently married the mother 
and acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father. MD. CODE 
ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
100. Turner, 327 Md. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938 (citing Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 
1, 7-8, 497 A.2d 142, 145 (1985), quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 542, 
283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971». 
101. [d. While the court does not so hold, it appears that Turner satisfied at least 
§ 1-208(b)(2) by filing a complaint claiming himself to be Jeffrey's biological 
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cited section 1-208 of the Estates & Trusts Article as a basis 
upon which he could seek to establish his status as Jeffrey's 
natural father. 102 
675 
Having determined that Turner could prove paternity through an 
equitable proceeding using section 1-208, the court noted that it is 
also proper to establish paternity by a statutory action in a paternity 
proceeding under the Family Law Article. 103 
The court highlighted the importance of the reciprocal nature of 
the Family Law and the Estates & Trusts Articles. 104 Section 5-1005 
of the Family Law Article provides that "[a]n equity court may 
determine the legitimacy of a child pursuant to [section] 1-208 of the 
Estates & Trusts Article." 105 Similarly, section 1-208(b)(1) provides 
that one way a child may be legitimized is if the father "[h]as been 
judicially determined to be the [natural] father in an action brought 
under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings." 106 From this 
link, the court concluded that the Maryland General Assembly "of-
fered a choice of actions by which one could seek to establish 
paternity." 107 
The court's recognition of the link between the Estates & Trusts 
Article and the Family Law Article was crucial because it provided 
Turner with the possibility of getting a blood test to establish 
paternity. Given the General Assembly's flexibility with respect to 
providing a choice of options under which to proceed, the court 
reasoned that the method of proving paternity should be the same 
under either statutory option. lOS The court quoted Shelley v. Smith lO9 
for the proposition that that "the rules of evidence controlling the 
proof of paternity ought to be the same in either case. "110 In other 
words, because blood test evidence can be used for proof of paternity 
father because he "acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father." See 
id. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Thus, under § 1-208, 
Turner alleged conformity with subsection (b) and complied with one of the 
required conditions. If Turner proved all of the elements of § 1-208(b), the 
circuit court would declare Jeffrey the legitimate child of Turner. Of course, 
favorable results from a blood test would be the best way for Turner to 
establish that he and Whisted are the "parents," in accordance with subsection 
(b). 
102. [d. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1005 (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
106. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b)(I) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
107. Turner, 327 Md. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938. 
108. See id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938. 
109. 249 Md. 619, 241 A.2d 682 (1968). 
110. Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (quoting Shelley, 249 Md. at 630, 
241 A.2d at 688). 
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in an action under the Family Law Article, III a blood test should 
likewise be available in a paternity action brought under the Estates 
& Trusts Article. 1 12 
After deciding that a blood test to establish paternity was ac-
ceptable under the Estates & Trusts Article, the court explained: (1) 
why establishing paternity under the Estates & Trusts Article is more 
appropriate in this case than proceeding under the Paternity Statute, 113 
and (2) how a motion for blood test would be handled at the circuit 
court level and the underlying policy considerations governing its 
decision. 114 
Under Turner, not only is the Estates & Trusts action a valid 
way to establish paternity under such circumstances, it is the preferred 
way.1I5 The court held that "in those cases where two men each 
acknowledge paternity of the same child, we believe that an action 
to establish paternity is more appropriately brought under the Estates 
& Trusts Article. "116 Quoting both Thomas and Dawson, the court 
explained that the "Estates & Trusts Article presents the 'more 
satisfactory' and 'less traumatic' means of establishing paternity." 117 
Next, the court explained how a trial judge should handle a 
motion for blood tests and the policy reasons regarding this matter. 
"A motion for blood tests made under the Estates & Trusts Article 
is best analyzed as a request for a physical examination under 
Maryland Rule 2-423,118 and the court has discretion to grant or deny 
the blood tests." 119 In a footnote, the court pointed out that blood 
tests are clearly permissible under this provision. 120 Viewing the blood 
test motion as a Rule 2-423 121 request for physical examination, the 
court held that a trial court may order blood tests in a paternity 
Ill. "In general-On the motion of a party to the proceeding or on its own motion, 
the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood 
tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the 
father of the child." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029(a) (1991 & Supp. 
1994). 
112. See Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 93S. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 113-17, 607 A.2d at 938-40 .. 
115. [d. at 113, 607 A.2d at 93S. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971), 
and Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 314, 262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970». 
lIS. Maryland Rule 2-423 permits the court to order an examination "[w]hen the 
mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party or of a person in the 
custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy." Turner, 327 
Md. at 114 n.l, 607 A.2d at 939 n.l (referring to MD. RULE 2-423). 
119. [d. at 113, 607 A.2d at 939. 
120. [d. 
121. MD. RULE 2-423. 
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proceeding under the Estates and Trusts Article "for good cause 
shown."'22 
Turner sets forth guidelines for a trial. court in an equity pro-
ceeding when it is confronted with a blood test motion pursuant to 
the Estates & Trusts Article. '23 In establishing these procedural guide-
lines, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the policy views 
expressed by the various Justices of the Supreme Court in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D.124 The comprehensive and insightful discussion by 
the Justices on both sides of the issue in Michael H.125 proved 
extremely valuable to Turner's holding. 
The Turner court first highlighted the policy underlying the 
plurality opinion of Michael H. upholding California's irrebuttable 
legitimacy presumption. '26 The Supreme Court relied upon the com-
mon-law presumption of legitimacy and society's protection of the 
"integrity of the marital family unit from claims of paternity by 
other men."127 The Court of Appeals of Maryland surmised that 
Michael H. was based upon the "promotion of family harmony" 
and a "reluctance to declare the children of a married woman 
illegitimate."'28 Maryland's highest court recognized that '''to provide 
protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a 
marital father, and vice versa.'" 129 
The Turner court also believed, however, that Justice Brennan's 
dissent warranted equal consideration. '30 The Turner majority quoted 
Brennan, who observed that prior case law 
produced a unifying theme: although an unwed father's 
biological link to his child does not, in and of itself, 
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with 
122. Turner, 327 Md. at 114, 607 A.2d at 939. The court stated that even though 
Jeffrey is not a party to the action, he may be tested. [d. at 116, 607 A.2d at 
940. Maryland Rule 2-423 "permits the physical examination of a party or a 
'person in the custody or under the legal control of a party.'" [d. (quoting 
MD. RULE 2-423). Consequently, the court suggested that it would be appro-
priate for the trial judge to "appoint counsel to represent Jeffrey's interests if 
it believes that those interests might be compromised by the blood test. If 
Jeffrey's best interests would be jeopardized by submitting to a blood test, the 
child's representative may then request a protective order." [d. 
123. [d. at 114-17,607 A.2d at 939-40. 
124. [d. at 114-16,607 A.2d at 939-40. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
(1989). 
125. For a discussion of the various rationales underlying the holding in Michael 
H., see infra text accompanying notes 128-33. 
126. Turner, 327 Md. at 114-15, 607 A.2d at 939. 
127. [d. (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125). 
128. [d. at 115, 607 A.2d at 939. 
129. [d. (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130) (emphasis in original). 
130. [d. at 115, 607 A.2d at 939-40. 
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that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-. 
child relationship wilI do so. When an unwed father dem-
onstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of par-
enthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing 
of his child," ... his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process 
Clause. 131 
In considering both the arguments of the plurality and the dissent 
in Michael H., the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided to give 
credence to both views.132 Thus, the Maryland high court held "that 
a trial court ought to be able to consider and balance the different 
interests that were separately recognized by the majority and the 
dissent in Michael H. "133 The court stated that treating a motion for 
a blood test as a discovery request "allows a court to weigh these 
competing interests [and] [m]ost significantly ... allows the court 
discretion to consider the best interests of the child." 134 
Thus, the court of appeals held that before blood tests wilI be 
ordered, the trial court must make an initial "best interests" deter-
mination. 135 As support for this procedure, the court cited In re 
Marriage of ROSSl36 and McDaniels v. Carlson,137 which both held 
that the child's best interests must be considered before ordering 
blood tests.138 
The court of appeals listed the following factors to be considered 
by the trial court in determining the "best interest" of the child: (1) 
the stability of the child's current home environment; (2) whether 
there is an ongoing family unit; (3) the child's physical, mental, and 
emotional needs; (4) the child's past relationship with the putative 
father; and (5) the child's ability to ascertain genetic information for 
the purpose of medical treatment and genealogical history. 139 
Finally, the court directed the trial court upon remand to "con-
sider the extent of Turner's commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, and balance his interest in establishing his status as 
Jeffrey's natural father against the Whisteds' interest in protecting 
the integrity of the familial relationships already formed. "140 The 
131. Id. at 115·16, 607 A.2d at 940 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael 
H., 491 U.S. at 142-43) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
132. Id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940. 
136. 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1989). See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
137. 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987). See supra notes 87·91 and accompanying text. 
138. Turner, 327 Md. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. 
139. Id. at 116-17, 607 A.2d at 940. 
140. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940. 
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court stated that the trial judge's "paramount concern" must be the 
protection of the child's interests. 141 
Therefore, the presumption of legitimacy in Maryland does not 
operate to preclude a blood test, although it is "impeded." 142 A 
blood test, if determined to be in the child's best interest, is now 
available. 143 As a result of Turner, if a trial judge determines that 
the child's best interests are not served by establishing paternity, the 
child may never know the true identity of his biological father. 
Additionally, if the establishment of paternity is in the child's best 
interests, the court held that it is more appropriately established in 
an equity proceeding under the Estates & Trusts Article, rather than 
in a statutory action pursuant to the Paternity Statute. l44 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
No doubt Turner will be received as one of Maryland's most 
important family law decisions. Turner's significance flows from its 
holding that a putative father may use blood tests to rebut the 
legitimacy presumption only if a paternity determination will operate 
in the child's best interests. 14s The court fashioned a workable and 
fair rule based on sound public policy considerations. However, the 
preliminary issues addressed by the Turner court, concerning which 
statute a trial court should proceed under, should have been decided 
differently. The court of appeals could have simply found a cause 
of action in the Paternity Statute alone. The court should not have 
declared that where a presumed father and a putative father both 
claim to be the biological father of the same child, "an action to 
t establish paternity is more appropriately brought under the Estates 
& Trusts Article." 146 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge l47 convincingly argued 
that the majority misapplied the law in concluding that Turner's 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. [d. at 112-13, 607 A.2d at 938. 
145. Id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. 
146. Id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (emphasis added). 
147. It should be noted that Judge Eldridge concurred in part and dissented in part. 
Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 941. Judge Eldridge concurred with respect to the 
court's decision to remand the case for a determination of whether Turner is 
entitled to a blood test to establish his paternity, but disagreed with the court's 
holding that Turner properly proceeded under the Estates and Trust Article, 
rather than the Family Law Article. Id. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941. In addition, 
Judge Eldridge dissented with the majority's decision that Turner "must prove 
that a declaration of paternity is in the child's best interests before blood tests 
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-423 will be ordered." Id. See infra notes 177-92 
and accompanying text. 
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action is "more appropriately brought under the Estates & Trusts 
Article . . . present[ing] the 'more satisfactory and less traumatic' 
means of establishing paternity." 148 Essentially, Judge Eldridge as-
serted that Turner's cause of action exists in the Paternity Statute, 
not in the Estates & Trust Article. 149 In explaining this argument, 
Judge Eldridge restated the pertinent language from section 1-208(b) 
of the Estates & Trusts article: "Child of his father. A child born 
to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with 
each other shall be considered to be the child of his father .... " 150 
Judge Eldridge further asserted that "[t]his portion of the statute 
presumes that the child being legitimated is in fact '[a] child born to 
parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each 
other. "'151 In other words, according to Judge Eldridge, the statute 
assumes that the child's biological parents are the mother and the 
man seeking to legitimate his child. It also assumes that there is no 
dispute as to the identity of the child's biological father. 152 His 
opinion stated that the statute was never designed as a "mechanism 
for the resolution" of paternity disputes.153 
Judge Eldridge asserted that a proper construction of section 1-
208 of the Estates & Trusts Article demonstrates that Turner should 
instead proceed under the Family Law Article. 154 In his concurring 
opinion, he pointed out that "Mr. Turner and Mr. Whisted each 
has a basis under the Estates and Trusts Article for asserting that he 
is the child's father."155 Turner claimed that Jeffrey was "born to 
parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each 
other." and, under section 1-208(b )(2), Turner acknowledged himself 
in writing to be Jeffrey's father. 156 Conversely, Mr. Whisted asserted 
under section 1-206 of the Estates & Trusts Article that Jeffrey "was 
'born or conceived during the marriage,'" and therefore that he is 
148. Turner, 327 Md. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941 (quoting the majority in Turner, 327 
Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938). 
149. [d. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942. 
ISO. [d. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-
208(b) (1991». 
lSI. [d. at 119,607 A.2d at 941. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. See id. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942. 
ISS. [d. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942. 
156. [d. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-
208 (1991». Judge Eldridge cited the following sources for the proposition that 
the pleading satisfies the acknowledgment in writing requirement under § 1-
208(b)(2): Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971) 
(acknowledgment of child in pleading satisfied both § 1-208(b)(2) and (b)(3»; 
Hall v. Coates, 62 Md. App. 252, 260, 489 A.2d 41, 45-46 (1985); Skeens v. 
Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 58, 480 A.2d 820, 825, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 
484 A.2d 274 (1984). See Turner, 327 Md. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942. 
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the presumed father .IS7 In his opinion, Judge Eldridge further stated 
that the fact that this situation can and does occur demonstrates that 
the Estates & Trust Article was never intended to resolve such 
disputes. ls8 Judge Eldridge concluded that 
[i]n order for § 1-208(b) ... to have a logical application, 
there cannot be a dispute as to whether the "parents" were 
married at the time of conception or birth. The provisions 
of the Estates and Trusts Article, because they were not 
designed to resolve an adversarial dispute between two men 
claiming paternity, require an assumption as to who is the 
natural father before a determination can be made concern-
ing which section of the statute applies. ls9 
Judge Eldridge also explained that "[b]ecause the Estates and 
Trusts Article presumes knowledge of the identity of the natural 
father before its legitimation procedures become meaningful," the 
Estates & Trusts Article is not suitable for resolving disputes such 
as the type found in Turner. 16o Moreover, he asserted that the 
Paternity Statute is the best way to proceed under such circum-
stances. 161 
In further support of this argument, Judge Eldridge addressed 
the strong language in the cases relied upon by the majority when it 
decided that the Estates & Trusts Article was applicable for Turner's 
purposes.162 He pointed out that in each of those cases there was no 
dispute as to the identity of the child's biological father, and it was 
the undisputed natural father who sought to legitimate his children 
born out of wedlock. 163 
Judge Eldridge also attacked the majority's reliance upon Thomas 
v. SolisY>4 In Thomas, the undisputed biological father sought to use 
section 1-208, not to establish himself as the natural father, but to 
protect his visitation rights and ensure that the adoption of the child 
by another individual would not occur without his consent. 16S Ac-
cording to Eldridge, "[a]t no point did anyone suggest that Thomas 
was not the children's natural father."I66 Furthermore, he pointed 
157. Turner, 327 Md. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 1-206 (I991». 
158. [d. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 119-20, 607 A.2d at 941-42. 
163. [d. at 119,607 A.2d at 941. 
164. [d. at 119, 607 A.2d at 941-42. 
165. Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 538,283 A.2d 777, 778 (1971). 
166. Turner, 327 Md. at 119, 607 A.2d at 942. 
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out that the court of appeals in Thomas held that the Estates & 
Trusts Article could only be used to establish paternity under the 
type of fact pattern that was presented to the court. 167 
Judge Eldridge also disagreed with the Turner majority's use of 
Dawson v. Eversburg for the statement that the legitimation statute 
provided a "less traumatic approach."168 He contended that the 
quoted phrase was taken out of context and was misapplied to the 
facts of the instant case. 169 In Dawson, the undisputed father, to 
ensure that his children would be his legitimate heirs, filed an 
adoption petition. 170 Judge Eldridge pointed to the Dawson holding 
for the proposition that when legitimization, and not inheritance, 
was the goal, the Estates & Trust Article was "less traumatic" as 
compared to the adoption statutes. 171 
Finally, Judge Eldridge argued that none of the Maryland cases 
relied upon by the majority involved the use of the Estates & Trust 
Article to settle paternity disputes.172 Instead, suits brought to resolve 
the question of the identity of a child's biological father "are more 
appropriately resolved under the Family Law Article."173 Nonetheless, 
Judge Eldridge concurred with the majority's decision to afford 
Turner an opportunity to establish paternity under the Estates & 
Trusts Article "because the General Assembly clearly intended that 
there be a judicial mechanism for resolving disputes over paternity," 
and because "no action was brought under the Family Law Article 
in this case." 174 
Judge Eldridge's analysis is convincing. The court should have 
simply concluded that the Family Law Article is the proper authority 
for resolving such disputes. The court would have avoided overex-
tending past precedents and stretching the applicability of the Estates 
& Trusts Article, especially because the court concluded that the 
Paternity Statute was equally applicable. 175 Aside from this procedural 
problem, however, Turner was decided correctly. Turner's most 
important aspect, the requirement of a "best interest" determination 
before allowing blood tests to rebut the legitimacy presumption, is 
the best solution to a sensitive problem-contrary to Judge Eldridge's 
potent dissent to this part of the majority's opinion. 176 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 314, 
262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970». 
169. Id. 
170. Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 309, 262 A.2d 729, 730 (1970). 
171. Turner, 327 Md. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. (citing Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 578 A.2d 761 (1990». 
174. Id. at 121,607 A.2d at 942-43. 
175. See id. at 112-13,607 A.2d at 938. 
176. Id. at 121,607 A.2d at 944. 
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Judge Eldridge agreed that a Rule 2-423 "good cause" analysis 
was appropriate, but argued that the implications of such an analysis 
are not as far reaching as the majority believed. 177 The dissent 
declared that traditional "good cause" analysis does not require a 
showing that a paternity determination be in the child's best interests 
before a court will allow blood tests.178 In other words, according to 
the dissent, "good cause," as used in Rule 2-423, is not synonymous 
with "best interests of the child." A good cause showing, argued 
Judge Eldridge, merely requires that the party requesting the blood 
test "demonstrate that the mental or physical character or condition 
of another party is material to an issue in the case."179 Thus, "blood 
test results would be material to the determination of who is Jeffrey's 
natural father." ISO The dissent further stated that "because the status 
of [the] natural father gives rise to a presumption that the best 
interests of the child are served by allowing the natural father 
visitation, the information obtained by the blood test is also material 
... for visitation."lsl 
In this respect, the dissent failed to see that the trial court must 
be allowed discretion in each case to determine if and when blood 
tests are proper. Certainly blood test results are material to the issue 
of the identity of the child's biological father. Paternity, however, 
is not the primary issue before the court at the onset. Rather, the 
"good cause" issue is whether it is in the child's best interests to 
determine the identity of the child's biological father, assuming 
arguendo that the presumed father is not the child's biological father. 
Under the view that it is always in the child's best interest to 
establish paternity, blood test results are never immaterial and should 
be ordered on demand. ls2 The majority, however, did not take such 
a mechanical and objective approach. The majority opinion instead 
adopted the realistic view that it is not always in the child's best 
interest to establish paternity.183 From a child's perspective, therefore, 
blood test results will only be material if determining paternity would 
be in his or her best interests. If determining paternity would not be 
in the child's best interest, then blood test results are immaterial and 
deserve no further consideration. 
The majority, unlike the dissent, recognized that in many in-
stances the child may be better served by not knowing the identity 
177. [d. at 122, 607 A.2d at 943 (Eldridge, J., dissenting in part). 
178. [d. at 123, 607 A.2d at 943. 
179. [d. at 122, 607 A.2d at 943 (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 302, 82 
A.2d 120, 122 (1951». 
180. [d. 
181. [d. (citing Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178,372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1977); 
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952». 
182. See Turner, 327 Md. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. 
183. [d. 
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of his biological father. The dissent was clearly troubled by the real 
possibility that the child's paternity may never be conclusively estab-
lished. Judge Eldridge wrote: 
I cannot subscribe to the proposition that relevant, ascer-
tainable evidence should be excluded because it may lead to 
a result which the court does not like .... I simply cannot 
agree with the majority's view that the government (through 
its courts) is entitled to determine in a particular case that 
one will be better off by the perpetuation of a falsity and 
the suppression of relevant, unprivileged facts. 
The notion that people's best interests are served by 
ignorance of the facts, enforced by a governmental entity, 
is reminiscent of the society portrayed in George Orwell's 
1984 .... While concealment of the truth is a fundamental 
tenet of totalitarian regimes, it should not be an operative 
principle in a free society. 184 
The dissent distinguished an adopted child's ignorance of the 
identity of his biological parents from a child's ignorance of the 
identity of his biological father under the circumstances in Turner. 18S 
The dissent pointed out that sealing adoption records was only 
instrumental after the General Assembly balanced the privacy interests 
involved. 186 Furthermore, the dissent argued that sealing adoption 
papers prevents the future disclosure of previously ascertained facts 
for collateral purposes, but does not prevent the ascertainment of 
these facts in the primary litigation. 18? Nonetheless, there is no 
escaping the fact that an adopted child will not know that he is 
adopted unless his parents disclose this information. 188 If it could be 
184. [d. at 124, 607 A.2d at 944. Judge Eldridge even quoted the engraving, 
"IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH," from one of buildings in Orwell's 1956 
novel for the notion that people's best interests are served by ignorance of the 
facts. [d. (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1956». 
185. [d. at 125-26, 607 A.2d at 944-45. 
186. [d. at 125, 607 A.2d at 944. 
187. [d. at 125-26, 607 A.2d at 945. 
188. The dissent was understandably concerned with the possibility under Turner 
that a child may go without knowing the identity of his natural father, and 
then, at some point in the future, may require his biological father's genetic 
information for medical treatment purposes. [d. at 126 n.7, 607 A.2d at 945 
n.7. Under § 5-329, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-329(a) (1991), an adopted 
individual may have access to his natural parent's medical information, assum-
ing it exists, if the court finds that the medical information is needed for his, 
or his relative's health. It should be noted, however, that this provision is of 
little help to an individual who was never informed that he was adopted. 
Perhaps the Maryland General Assembly should consider requiring that a 
father's medical history be compiled, entered, and made available to the child 
as part of the best interest hearing, in the same way as medical information is 
made available to an adopted individual under § 5-329. 
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in a child's best interests to keep his biological identity concealed in 
adoption cases, then conceivably it could also be in a child's best 
interests to conceal his biological identity under the circumstances of 
the in,stant case. 189 
Finally, the dissent quoted a commentator for the purpose of 
explaining the "illogic of the majority's position."I90 
The question of the child's best interests ... does not arise 
until the putative father has first been accorded his proce-
dural right to standing to establish his paternity. This is not 
to say that the best interests of the child are unimportant, 
but only that they are irrelevant to the preliminary and 
essential factual determination of paternity. A successful 
paternity action by a putative father does not automatically 
entitle him to custody, for example, nor even to visitation 
with his child. 191 ' 
189. The dissenting judge offered a "switched at birth" hypothetical to illustrate 
an extreme example of Turner. Turner, 327 Md. at 124-25, 607 A.2d at 944. 
Two mothers each give birth to a baby girl. [d. Through hospital negligence, 
the two mothers return home to their families with the wrong child. [d. 
Eldridge asserted that in order to examine the hospital records to discover 
whether the switch actually occurred, a court would have to first determine 
that it would be in each child's best interest to make such a finding. [d. Of 
course, this assumes that the dissent is correct in applying a Turner analysis 
to this example. 
Unfortunately, the dissenting opinion does not create all of the relevant 
facts of its hypothetical problem. If the possibility of the switch was discovered 
two days after the mothers returned home, a trial judge should certainly find 
it to be in the child's best interest to have this matter resolved, and thus order 
the records open. If both children are members of strong, close, and healthy 
families, however, and the suspicion arises at an older age, the determination 
is not as clear. One or both girls may be especially sensitive or unstable; one 
girl may have a severe disability that caused family bonds to become extraor-
dinarily tight due to working through the pain and hardship together. A 
paternity determination does not coincide with a child's best interests under 
each and every circumstance. 
It is questionable, however, that Turner is even applicable to the "switched 
at birth" hypothetical because the family dynamics in a case such as Turner 
are very different. Accordingly, a putative father's claim is too easily motivated 
by revenge, jealousy, and hatred. This is not the case in the "switched at 
birth" hypothetical because the integrity of the husband-wife relationship is 
not being challenged. Furthermore, having the child learn that she is the 
offspring of an adulterous affair may more likely be detrimental to the child's 
welfare than having the child learn of the "switch." For these reasons, inter 
alia, Turner may not apply. 
190. Turner, 327 Md. at 127, 607 A.2d at 945. 
191. [d. at 127, 607 A.2d at 945 (quoting Jean E. McEwen, R. McG. & C.W. v. 
J.W. & W.W.: THE PUTATIVE FATHER's RIGHT TO STANDING TO REBUT THE 
MARITAL PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 669, 688 (1981» 
(emphasis in original). 
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If the majority defined the essential preliminary question as that of 
the child's paternity, then the above-quoted comment would have 
merit. However, the majority made it clear that the preliminary 
question was instead, whether establishing paternity would be in the 
child's best interests. '92 Therefore, if as stated above, a successful 
paternity action does not guarantee the putative father at least 
visitation, it seems careless to rush into making a determination that 
could have devastating effects upon the child. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Turner should have held that an action under the Paternity 
Statute, rather than an equitable proceeding under the Estates & 
Trusts Article, is the only procedure for establishing paternity of a 
child presumed to be the legitimate child of another man. Despite 
this defect, Turner fashions a workable and equitable solution to an 
unfortunate set of Circumstances. In balancing the various policy 
considerations, the court succeeded in keeping the child's best inter-
ests paramount to the interests of the other litigants. 
Turner's practical effect will probably be that under most fact 
patterns, a blood test will be granted. The very fact that such a case 
even arises may indicate a weak family bond-especially where the 
putative father, as in the instant case, has developed a relationship 
with the child, and the husband and wife appear to be separated. 
The dissent's fears that a child may grow up never knowing the 
true identity of his or her natural father are legitimate. Unfortunately, 
it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where a child's knowledge 
of his or her biological father would irreparably damage that child's 
emotional and psychological well-being. The court does not hide 
from the reality that there are times when the truth exacts a price 
too costly for a child to pay. However, in practice, the threshold 
test will not be as onerous as portrayed by the dissent. In the 
majority of cases, it will likely be in the child's best interest to 
determine who is the child's real father. 
David J. Shuster 
192. [d. at 116-17.607 A.2d at 940. 
